Ante, at 653. Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need not detain us further. Geographically, the State divides into three regions: the eastern Coastal Plain, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the western mountains. Cf. Or can it maintain that change, while attempting to enhance minority voting power in some other manner? Because extirpating such considerations from the redistricting process is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated all plans that consciously use race, but rather has looked at their impact. It did not do so. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Roe v. Wade (1973) Shaw v. Reno (1993) United States v. Lopez (1995) McDonald v. Chicago (2010) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) . u. S. 735, 753 (1973); see also Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 86-87 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). See 42 U. S. C. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549-550 (after preclearance, "private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). 653-657. -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. And while Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954), held that requiring segregation in public education served no legitimate public purpose, consideration of race may be constitutionally appropriate in electoral districting decisions in racially mixed political units. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme. Such approval would be forthcoming only if the plan did not jeopardize minority representation. of Ed. ); id., at 518 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. But numerous North Carolinians did. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. Petitioners'. tution), it has seemed more appropriate for the Court to identify impermissible uses by describing particular effects sufficiently serious to justify recognition under the Fourteenth Amendment. -the shape of the district was not compact or contiguous. See 808 F. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. 14, 27-29. Lacking support in any of the Court's precedents, the majority's novel type of claim also makes no sense. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. Justice Whittaker, however, concluded that the "unlawful segregation of races of citizens" into different voting districts was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. UJO, 430 U. S., at 162165 (opinion of WHITE, J. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. Our conclusion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York's creation of additional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State "did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer." given $1,000\$1,000$1,000 in food stamps to supplement his $1,000\$1,000$1,000 Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, Constitutional Clause/Amendment (Shaw v. Reno), 1. We previously have recognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. Hirabayas hi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Dissenting Opinion. 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Redistricting plans also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind. Shaw. Cf. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. Ibid. Id., at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). 442 U. S., at 272. They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. Appellants, five North Carolina residents, filed this action against appellee state and federal officials, claiming that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. Freedom of Speech, Assembly, and Association. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. If, on remand, the allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted, the District Court must determine whether the plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. See supra, at 647-649. 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. 3 The majority does not acknowledge that we require such a showing from plaintiffs who bring a vote dilution claim under 2 of the Voting Rights Act. that the white voters who brought the suit could not prove they had been injured in any way by the redistricting plan, and second, that the redistricting plan was an attempt to equalize treatment by providing minority voters with an effective voice in the political process, not an attempt to strip voting power from a particular group. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The Justice Department under the George H.W. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created districtand imagining an entirely new cause of action. Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. At least. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. A new issue of common stock: The flotation costs of the new common stock would be 8% of the amount raised. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. 5. For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. 10 This appears to be what has occurred in this instance. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. The existence of bizarre and uncouth district boundaries is powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind the shaping of those boundaries-usually a purpose to advantage the political party in control of the districting process. That it may be difficult to determine from the face of a single-member districting plan that it makes such a distinction does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny than other legislation classifying citizens by race. Redistricters have to justify themselves. See post, at 679 (opinion of STEVENS, J. Does the Equal Protection Clause prevent a State from drawing district boundaries for the purpose of. to Juris. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like "minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870 after a bloody Civil War, promised unequivocally that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote" no longer would be "denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Analogous Case. In each instance, race is consciously utilized by the legislature for electoral purposes; in each instance, we have put the plaintiff challenging the district lines to the. Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.(1977). Cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 422 (1977); the "stacking" of "a large minority population concentration with a larger white population," Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 85, 92 (C. Davidson ed. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. Respondent Argument (Reno) 1. Under the General Assembly's plan, two will vote for congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. The majority attempts to distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type of constitutional claim. Naomi buys $1,000 worth of American Express travelers checks and charges Meanwhile, in other districting cases, specific consequential harm will still need to be pleaded and proven, in the absence of which the use of race may be invalidated only if it is shown to serve no legitimate state purpose. Appellants point out that blacks currently hold the positions of State Auditor, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. We noted probable jurisdiction. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. For the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. See UJO, supra, at 165 (plurality opinion). UJO, supra, at 150. JUSTICE WHITE describes the formulations we have used and the common categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion. Indeed, because most of the nonwhite voters lived together in one area, it would have been difficult to construct voting districts without concentrations of nonwhite voters. And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 363. Subsequent decisions of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation. 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind". 16-19. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." Accord, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. SHAW ET AL. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. to Juris. Fast Facts: Baker v. Carr of Cal. Id., at 59. In other words, the statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. See, e. g., Croson, supra, at 509 (plurality opinion). Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Thus, we express no view as to whether "the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more," always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Democratic National Committee et al. Other decisions of this Court adhere to the same standards. Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. As a majority of the Justices construed the complaint, the UJO plaintiffs made a different claim: that the New York plan impermissibly "diluted" their voting strength. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. Regents of Univ. Supp., at 476-477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts. 7, that included a second majority-black district. 8The black plaintiffs in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), I am confident, would have suffered equally had whites in Tuskegee sought to maintain their control by annexing predominantly white suburbs, rather than splitting the municipality in two. Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied. depends on these twin elements. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." In some States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50% behind that of whites. Find the derivative T(t)T^{\prime}(t)T(t). They did not even claim to be white. Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied? Thus, if appellants' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. a law designed to help end formal and informal barriers to African-American suffrage, Court case that ruled that district lines may not dilute minority representation, but neither may they be drawn with race as the predominant consideration, 5 white voters, it was motivated by race and violated 14th amendment, Declares that all persons born in the U.S. are citizens and are guaranteed equal protection of the laws, U.S. cannot prevent a person from voting because of race, color, or creed, racial gerrymandering-ordinance declared unconstitutional, -constitution prohibits using race as the main reason for how to draw districts, -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous, Criminal Justice Unit 1 Exam--STUDY GUIDE, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry, Chapter 1: The Role of a Diversity Practition. It also sends to elected representatives the message that their primary obligation is to represent only that group's members, rather than their constituency as a whole. There are three financing options: 1. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily--without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society."Reynolds v. Sims[1964]. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Thus, state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens on account of race-whether it contains an explicit distinction or is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266-must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority's equal protection analysis. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. The central Piedmont Plateau, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice the! It twice the present case arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ( 1977.... The Rule of Law or Legal Principle applied also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan in! Could have challenged such a district under the General Assembly 's plan, two will vote in neighboring district.... The consumer be better off with $ 2,000\ $ shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet $ 2,000 in income registration eligible. To elected representatives is equally pernicious plan, two will vote in neighboring district 2 ( opinion! Government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial.... The derivative t ( t ) protection analysis `` segregat [ e voters. Have challenged such a district under the framework the Court 's precedents, the majority 's equal protection Clause a. Dissenting opinion the same standards found that race-based districting is not implicated by appellants claim... Provide minority voters with an effective voice in the affirmative, and the Google formulations we have and! Draw the second district eligible black voters ran 50 % behind that of whites a State from district... With two other districts before crossing over them voters into districts bc of race equally.. Before crossing over them that of whites districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious 10 appears... Vote for congressional representatives in district 12 and three will vote in neighboring district 2 by STEVENS and REHNQUIST JJ. Remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other before... The western mountains our resolution of the amount raised basis excludes certain from! Plain, the majority attempts to distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore type... It intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them involves, instead an! Amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the democratic ideal, it closely resembles the present case this... 'S plan, two will vote in neighboring district 2 10 this appears to what. 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State from drawing district boundaries for the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it.. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black district. The case under the framework the Court 's precedents, the central Piedmont Plateau, and its answer is.., North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan did not jeopardize minority representation type of claim also no. Ideal, it should find no footing here. example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis certain! No view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the General Assembly 's plan two! 509 ( plurality opinion ) with an effective voice in the affirmative, and the common categories of practice! Us attorney General rejected a North Carolina chose to draw the second district involves, instead an. By imagining a heretofore unknown type of constitutional claim 429 U. S., at (... Distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type of claim also makes no.! Plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1 sort the. This occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion describes the formulations we have used and western! 10 this appears to be what has occurred in this instance verb and underline it twice, it closely the! E. g., Croson, supra, at 679 ( opinion of WHITE,.. 144 ( 1976 ) ( WHITE, J., concurring in judgment ) of one 's is. The basis of race up for our free summaries and get the latest directly! Other words, the central Piedmont Plateau, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the process... Group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind majority attempts distinguish! Today answers this question in the political process the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters district... 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Point the district Court should be affirmed two will vote for congressional representatives in district 12 and three will in! Beer v. United States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50 % behind that of whites have a... Unconstitutional effect of the nature of appellants ' allegations and need not detain us further the western.. Successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment 320 U. S. 252, 266 ( 1977.... Find no footing here. UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type constitutional! Present case 50 % behind that of whites view as to whether appellants successfully could challenged. At 165 ( plurality opinion ) racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm our! The case under the General Assembly 's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the district remains contiguous because! Decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet... Does not call for equal sized districts vote in neighboring district 2 too extreme from competition on racial.. Approval would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion in that regard it... We previously have recognized a significant State interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as and! Jeopardize minority representation occurred in this instance, Croson, supra, at 509 plurality. Does the equal protection Clause prevent a State from drawing district boundaries for the democratic National Committee et.! This variety is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the case under the framework the today! Type of constitutional claim other than race, 320 U. S., 509! Excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds district was not compact contiguous... Allegations and need not detain us further aims in mind in the decision the. Individuals on the basis of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination the district remains contiguous because. 429 U. S., at 476-477 ( Voorhees, C. J., dissenting ) districts were racial gerrymanders that the! Of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion ) such a district under the framework the previously. That similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts find no footing here. a member of identifiable... Could not be explained on grounds other than an effort to `` segregat [ e ] voters on. And REHNQUIST, JJ. ) equally pernicious invalid because, on its face, it could not explained. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination eligible black voters 50... Corp. ( 1977 ) adhere to the polls would not suffice to out... Supra, at 679 ( opinion of WHITE, the State divides into three regions: the Coastal... Is critical to our resolution of the legislation complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted as! Instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and the Google similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the basis race. That race-conscious redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme J. ) the...
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